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before marriage.  Despite these findings, in recent decades cohabitation rates 
have dramatically increased in both Europe and the United States.  Instrumental 
variables estimations on data from 28 industrialized countries and 50 U.S. states 
show cohabitation strongly correlated with increases in women’s labor force 
participation, where a 10 percent increase in women’s labor force participation 
results in a 6.4 to 14.6 percent increase in cohabitation. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Concern over the future of the traditional family has become the focus of a deeply divisive debate in 
many western countries.  A major social change in recent decades has been the dramatic increase in 
the rate of cohabitation of heterosexual unmarried partners: According to U.S. Census estimates, the 
number of unmarried cohabiting couples in the United States has increased approximately ten-fold 
since 1970 to nearly 4.2 million in 2002.  A recent study of women in their thirties found that the 
first residential union for 52 percent of American women and 70 percent of British women was 
cohabitation rather than marriage.  In some Scandinavian countries the figure was found to be even 
higher; for example, in Sweden it has reached over 90 percent (Kiernan, 2003). 
 This paper uses game-theoretic and empirical methods common to economics to explore 
several interesting empirical phenomena related to cohabitation and marriage.  The first is that while 
cohabitation is often viewed as an alternative to marriage in which greater flexibility is perceived to 
enhance relational satisfaction, empirical studies reveal a consistently and significantly lower level of 
relational satisfaction among cohabiting couples than among married couples (Nock, 1995; Brown and 
Booth, 1996; Stack and Eshleman, 1998; Treas and Giesen, 2000).  Another common motivation for 
cohabitation is its use as a pre-marital screening device.  Yet empirical studies consistently reveal 
higher rates of unhappiness and divorce among married couples who previously cohabited, a 
phenomenon referred to in the literature as the “cohabitation effect,” which has remained a puzzle 
among social psychologists (Thompson and Colella,1992; Bumpas and Sweet, 1989; Bennett, Blanc, 
and Bloom, 1988; Booth and Johnson, 1988).   
 Using a game-theoretic framework, I develop a theory that seeks to explain these empirical 
phenomena.  First, I demonstrate why we should expect marriage to result in a higher level of 
relational satisfaction than cohabitation.  The essential idea is that for a broader range of individuals, 
marriage promotes self-control more effectively than cohabitation.  The intuition is the following: 
Define S as the minimum T-period consequence that is required to check selfish behavior toward a 
partner.  If the consequences of exiting a bad marriage are more severe than the consequences of 
exiting a bad cohabitation, an individual is more likely to accept S  within marriage than in cohabitation 
in lieu of exiting the relationship.  This makes S a more credible deterrent to selfish behavior within 
marriage than cohabitation.  As a result, for a range of individuals full cooperation is possible in 
marriage, while in cohabitation only a "pseudo-cooperative" behavior is possible, a lower level of 
cooperation characterized by occasional defections.  That it is more difficult for either party to walk 
away from marriage than cohabitation makes the cooperative outcome more likely within marriage.   
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Why might couples who cohabit before marriage be more likely to divorce?  If there is 
imperfect information, the model predicts that some couples will choose to cohabit as a pre-marital 
screening device.  These couples are a self-selected group for whom cooperation, even within 
marriage, is most uncertain.  For these couples, the pseudo-cooperative behavior under the relative 
instability of cohabitation may establish expectations about partner behavior that are taken with the 
couple into marriage, fostering an outcome that is worse than what the couple could have achieved 
from a different set of expectations formed by entering into marriage directly.  Thus the cohabitation 
effect can be explained by factors related to both self-selection and behavioral expectations. 
If cohabitation is empirically associated with lower levels of happiness, then why is it on the 
rise in western society?  The model generates hypotheses that are used to explain cohabitation trends 
in Europe and the United States, and account for cross-sectional differences between countries.  
Since increases in cohabitation rates appear to have started in most countries during the mid-1960s 
to early 1970s, possible candidates for an explanation would appear to be (a) a general liberalization 
of divorce laws that occurred in many western countries during this period; (b) the widespread 
introduction of the contraceptive pill in the mid-60s; (c) the widespread legalization of abortion in 
the early 1970s; and (d) the increase in women’s wages and labor force participation.   
Of these four factors, the model highlights the effects from the legalization of abortion and 
the increase in women’s wages and labor force participation.  The intuition is that factors (a) and (b) 
yield ambiguous effects on the marriage/cohabitation choice.  However, children are more likely to 
be desired within than out of wedlock, so that the availability of abortion increases the reservation 
payoff within cohabitation more than marriage.  Interestingly, women’s labor force participation 
influences a couple toward cohabitation through two channels: It substitutes women’s time away 
from household activity, lowering the gains from cooperation (through activity specialization) within 
the relationship while also increasing reservation payoffs outside a relationship.   
Separate estimations on data from 28 industrialized countries and 50 U.S. states, each using 
instruments to control for the endogeneity of cohabitation, point to women’s labor force participation 
as the unique factor among these significantly associated with higher levels of cohabitation.  These 
findings are corroborated by a difference-in-differences estimation on the U.S. state data showing 
changes in cohabitation rates between 1990 and 2000.  Results indicate that a 10 percent increase in 
women’s labor force participation is associated with a 6.4 to 14.6 percent increase in the rate of 
cohabitation.  The paper continues with a survey of recent trends and empirical studies on 
cohabitation and marriage relationships in Section II.  The theoretical model is presented in Section 
III, empirical results in Section IV, and Section V offers some conclusions from the research. 
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II. COHABITATION AND MARRIAGE: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Though most research on marriage and relationships has been undertaken by sociologists 
and psychologists, marriage is an institution that has increasingly attracted the attention of 
economists since the seminal work of Becker (1973, 1974).  Much research since then, such as Laine 
(1992), has focused on gaining a deeper understanding of mate selection, or “matching equilibria” in 
the marriage market.  Other work has centered on the childbearing decision (Murphy, 2002), and 
intra-household bargaining between spouses (Carter and Katz, 1997).  Kevane and Wydick (2001) 
and Seaton (2001) provide empirical tests of Nash bargaining models applied to marriage in 
developing and developed country contexts, respectively.   
More recently Matouschek and Rasul (2006) attempt to empirically distinguish between three 
motives for marriage: as an institution that provides an exogenous payoff to partners, marriage as a 
commitment device, and finally as a screening device.  The authors exploit the timing in the 
implementation of unilateral divorce laws in the United States their empirical study, concluding that 
the predominant reason people marry is that marriage serves as a commitment device. 
 While economics has made forays into understanding the nature of relationships, the most 
substantial studies of marriage and cohabitation have been undertaken in social psychology, where 
researchers have carried out a rich array of both theoretical and empirical work.  Batlova and Cohen 
(2002) document differences in cohabitation across countries.  Rates of unmarried cohabitation 
among adults for selected countries from their study are given in Table 1.  Other research has 
revealed changes in attitudes toward cohabitation, which have become increasingly accepting in 
most western societies (Bumpass and Sweet, 1989; Booth and Crouter, 2002; Thornton and Young-
de Marco, 2001).  Taken from the latter, Table 2 illustrates the greater social tolerance of 
cohabitation in the United States.  In Britain, Haskey (2001) finds that the percentage of those 
agreeing that “living together outside of marriage is always wrong” dropped from about 45 percent 
among those in the 1920 birth cohort to about 8 percent in the 1960 birth cohort.   
 Nevertheless, empirical studies by social psychologists have consistently found that married 
people report higher levels of personal happiness than unmarried people (Diener et. al., 2000; Stack 
and Eshleman, 1998), a result that seems to hold across countries, cultures, and time periods, although 
the difference in happiness between single and married people has narrowed in recent years (Frey and 
Stutzer, 2002).  A key question is the extent to which the correlation between marriage and happiness 
is due to selection effects, or whether it is marriage itself that causes people to be happier.  Some 
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studies such as Mastekaasa (1992), Stutzer and Frey (2005), and Frey and Stutzer (2006) have found 
significant selection effects of happy people into marriage.   
 Frey and Stutzer utilize data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study, a data set 
spanning from 1984 to 2000 from which they are able to carry out estimations on up to 133,952 
observations of 15,268 individuals, with some of these individuals moving from singleness to marriage 
during the 17-year sample period.   First, they find marriage to be associated with significantly higher 
levels of happiness than singleness (with happiness of cohabitants ranking in the middle).   The effect 
is sizeable, equivalent to the difference in a person having 2.5 times the mean household income 
instead of the mean household income.  Second, their analysis using panel data allows them to 
uncover significant evidence of self-selection effects of happy people into marriage.  Interestingly 
these self-selection effects are strongest among two groups of individuals, those who marry in their 
early 20s and those who marry after their early 30s.  In both of these groups, Frey and Stutzer find 
that those in the relevant group who will later marry report significantly higher life satisfaction scores 
than those who will remain single. 
 Other research has focused on the similarities and differences in relational outcomes between 
marriage and cohabitation, i.e. is it togetherness that brings happiness, or is happiness in some way related 
to commitment?  The empirical evidence suggests that while cohabiting couples report moderately 
greater levels of personal happiness than single people (Stack and Eshleman, 1998; Frey and Stutzer, 
2002), there is a significant difference between marriage and cohabitation in reported happiness and 
relational functionality (Nock, 1995; Brown and Booth, 1996; Stack and Eshleman, 1998; Treas and 
Giesen, 2000).  The empirical results of Brown and Booth are typical of the literature, and are carried 
out on a sample of 13,017 individuals using 1987-1988 U.S. National Survey of Family and 
Households data.  Their results show that relative to marriage, cohabitation is significantly associated 
with greater levels of disagreement in relationships, a lower perception of relational fairness, relative 
unhappiness, and less frequent partner interaction.  
 Empirical research also suggests a higher level of sexual infidelity among cohabiting 
couples than married couples.  On a sample of 3,432 Americans from the 1992 National Health 
and Social Life Survey, Treas and Giesen (2000) reveal a significantly higher likelihood of sexual 
infidelity among cohabiting couples than married couples.  They conclude that even “controlling 
for sexual values…did not eliminate the significant association between infidelity and cohabitation, 
a result that pointed to commitment mechanisms as likely influences on sexual behavior” (p.58).  
 Recent research has furthermore tried to understand why married couples who cohabit 
prior to marriage appear to experience higher levels of dissatisfaction, separation, and divorce 
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than couples who did not previously cohabit, i.e. the causes of the "cohabitation effect".  Self-
selection based on demographic characteristics and relational attitudes appear to account for 
part of the phenomenon. But Cohan and Kleinbaum (2002) conclude from laboratory 
experiments with couples involved in problem solving exercises that the cohabitation effect is 
due principally to poor relationship-building skills and communication habits in marriage that 
are developed during cohabitation.  In response to the question "Why are prior cohabiters 
more likely to get divorced?" they respond that “Pre-marital cohabitation experience appears 
to be a vulnerability spouses bring into marriage that puts them at risk for poor marital 
communication” (p.189).   
 
III.   THE MODEL 
3.1.   Basic Framework 
Consider the "Relationship game” in Figure 1, involving two players, Candy and Bubba.  
Candy and Bubba play an infinitely repeated game in which each has a defecting and a cooperative 
strategy.  Bubba's strategies are to Go Out Drinkin' or Stay Home/Fix Sink, while Candy's strategies 
are to Be Sweet or Nag Bubba, strategies intended to reflect the nitty-gritty of potential marital 
conflict.  Let δi   be the per-period discount factor, where for each representative player ( )1,0∈iδ , 
and the distribution of individuals across (0,1) is uniform. The model incorporates the following 
three axioms: 
The Human Frailty (HF) Axiom.  Though purely altruistic motives can certainly influence behavior in 
relationships, I posit that the human tendency toward self-interested behavior influences decision-
making.  Payoffs in marriage are zxy −fff 0 , indicative of a Prisoners’ Dilemma, such that each 
player has a dominant strategy characterized by the more selfish behavior in the stage game.   
The “Not-Just-A-Piece-Of-Paper” (NJPP) Axiom. After any stage of the repeated interaction, either player 
may choose to exit the game.  However, if either spouse exits a marriage, both receive the divorce 
payoff, ν, which is lower than the reservation payoff for breakup of non-marital unions, α, which are 
both smaller than x.  The second axiom merely says that marriage vows matter.  Breaking such vows, 
and the legal agreement that lies behind them, is more painful than if vows were never made.  
(Temporarily we will normalize ν to zero.) 
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The “Codependence Invites Defection” (CID) Axiom.  I will assume that a cooperative relationship must be 
characterized by a Nash equilibrium that is not only subgame-perfect, but “renegotiation-proof,” 
providing no incentive for renegotiation between players at any stage of the game.  When players 
threaten to retaliate against a defection, the response must be credible; otherwise such statements 
merely invite partner defections and codependent behavioral patterns.  (For an excellent review on 
codependent behaviors, see Prest and Protinsky, (1993)).   
 Given the HF, NJPP, and CID axioms, each spouse will engage in the cooperative behavior 
if the consequences from short-term selfish behavior are sufficiently high.  The following inequality 
gives the conditions under which the T-period consequence will deter a one-period episode of 
selfish behavior in the relationship: 
 xxxxxxzzzy iii
T
i
T
iii
∞∞+ ++⋅++<+++−−−− δδδδδδδδ ......... 212 .        
Algebraic manipulation of (1) shows that selfish behavior is deterred by the T-period consequences 
when 
i
T
ii
zx
xy
δ
δδ
−
−
<
+
−
+
1
1
.     (1) 
 The rationale for the CID axiom is evident at this point, i.e. the T-period consequences 
necessary to deter selfish behavior must be credible, or we should rule out the strategy profile as a 
possible equilibrium.  Suppose the defecting player can either play a strategy of “defiance” (further 
defection) or “contrition” (cooperation) in response to any punishment strategy by the other player 
after he or she defects.  Because x > 0, notice that given a defiant strategy by a defector, the affected 
partner’s best response to a one-period defection may be to let "bygones be bygones,” to renegotiate 
in favor of a return to cooperation since defiance yields the Pareto-inferior (0,0) payoff for the 
T-period duration.  Thus the possibility of renegotiation may encourage a codependent behavioral 
pattern that “enables” defections and thus inhibits Nash cooperation. But since (by the HF axiom) 
y > x, the T-period consequences are renegotiation-proof if the defector plays the contrite strategy in 
response to his defection, or “accepts the consequences of being selfish.”  Unlike the (0,0) payoff, 
there is no incentive for both players to renegotiate the (y,-z) payoff since payoffs in the 
consequence phase are Pareto efficient (see Benoit and Krishna, 1993).   
 Within marriage, where the "out option" is ν = 0, the condition must therefore be 
established under which the defecting partner will play the contrition strategy during the T-period 
consequences in order regain the value of the mutual cooperative outcome within the relationship.  
This condition is given by (2): 
0...... 12 >+++−−−−− ∞− xxzzzz i
T
i
T
iii δδδδδ , or equivalently 
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Notice that by equation (1) the punishment period T must be sufficiently large, while (2) requires that 
the punishment period T must be sufficiently small.  Both will hold given sufficiently high δ, and the 
range of individuals i for whom both (1) and (2) are satisfied thus determine those that are able to 
obtain a cooperative marriage outcome.  
In contrast, consider cohabitation where the exit option from the relationship, α, is relatively 
less painful than divorce, i.e. xv << α .  After any stage game, an unsatisfied partner can leave the 
relationship, resulting in a payoff of 
iδ
α
−1
 to each player for the remainder of the game.   
The conditions that will deter selfish behavior in cohabitation are the same as for marriage, 
and are given in (1).  What changes with cohabitation is the willingness of the offending party to 
internalize the consequences of his or her own selfish behavior.   This condition is necessary for the 
Nash equilibrium to be renegotiation-proof, and for cohabitation they are that  
αδαδαδαδδδδδ ∞∞− ++++>+++−−−−− iiiiTiTiii xxzzzz ......... 212 , or 
T
i
zx
z
1






+
+
>
αδ .    (3) 
By the Folk Theorem of repeated games, the minimum (α,α) payoff is guaranteed in cohabitation.  
However, it can be seen by examining the conditions in (2) and (3) that the consequence acceptance 
conditions on δi  are more easily fulfilled under marriage than under cohabitation.  In fact, there is a 
range of δi   for which cooperation is possible in marriage, but only a lower payoff is obtainable in 
cohabitation, obtainable either by exiting the relationship or a in a “pseudo-cooperative” equilibrium 
in which each player plays just cooperatively just frequently enough to keep the other from exiting 
the relationship.  This is demonstrated in the proof to PROPOSITION 1.  (Formal proofs to all 
propositions in the paper are given in an appendix available on the author's website, but the basic 
intuition of the results will be provided here.) 
PROPOSITION 1: The cooperative equilibrium is feasible for more individuals in marriage than cohabitation. 
Figure 2 illustrates the ranges over ( )1 ,0∈iδ  where selfish behavior is deterred.  Notice from 
Figure 2 that the marriage contract functions as a discipline device for the middle-range types within 
the spectrum.  Refer to (1) as the Defection Deterrence (DD) curve and (2) and (3) as the 
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Consequence Acceptance curves (CA and CA′).  For equilibrium cooperation to be feasible in 
marriage (cohabitation), we must have δi  such that the CA (CA') curve lies above the DD curve.   
Intersection of the CA and CA′ curves with the DD curve in Figure 2 indicates the critical 
values, δM and δC , for which renegotiation-proof Nash cooperation is possible within marriage and 
cohabitation, respectively.  For those with [ )1,Ci δδ ∈  the equilibrium is possible in either 
cohabitation or in marriage, while for those with ( )Mi δδ ,0∈ , it is never possible.  For those with 
( )CMi δδδ ,∈ , the DD curve lies below the CA curve but above the CA' curve, meaning that 
marriage uniquely provides the credible check against selfish behavior. 
3.2.  Happiness in Marriage and Cohabitation 
 The introduction listed two common motives for cohabitation.  Here I will focus on the first 
motivation, the desire for increased relational flexibility.  Suppose that partners make a single choice 
of cohabitation or marriage and then view the relationship as plays of an infinitely repeated game 
within that arrangement.   
 In this “meta-game” let’s introduce imperfect information into the model.  This is not 
necessarily the standard problem of asymmetric information; those considering marriage often worry 
not only about their partner’s ability to sustain a positive relationship, but also their own ability.  Here 
any mistakes in entering into marriage must involve not just one misperception, but rather two: the 
misperception of Partner 1 believing his own δi to be greater than Mδ , when it is in fact lower, 
simultaneous with the same misperception by Partner 2 about δi  of Partner 1, or vice versa.  
 To keep the analysis simple, assume now that both partners possess equal but imperfect 
information over ≡δ~ min{ }ji δδ , , or the true minimum δ  of the couple, where we will assume δ~  
is distributed uniformly over the interval ( δ,0 ].   Let ( )δ~gˆ  be a uniform density function where the 
domain of ( ) ],0[~ˆ δδ ⊂g  and ( )⋅Gˆ  be its associated distribution function.  The true δ~ lies within the 
interval c  with mean δˆ  such that 



+−∈
2
ˆ
,
2
ˆ
~ cc δδδ , where the parameter c  constitutes a measure 
of imperfect information.  A higher δˆ  thus implies a distribution function that is (first-order) 
stochastically dominant over the distribution function yielded by lower values of δˆ , or 
( ) ( )⋅<⋅ ba GG ˆˆ  for all δ, where ba δδ ˆˆ > .   
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 Consider now the decision couples make between cohabitation and marriage.  A couple 
chooses marriage if ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )αδδνδδ CCMM GxGGxG ˆˆ1ˆˆ1 +−>+− ,  which becomes 
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Let *δ be the lowest level of δˆ  for which ( )⋅Gˆ satisfies equation (5).  Through substituting the 
uniform density function with information parameter c  into (5), we find that every couple with 
*
ˆ δδ ≥  will choose marriage, and every couple with *ˆ δδ <  will choose cohabitation where      
 ( ) 

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



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
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να
δ
22
1* c
x
c
MMCC .   (6) 
 Since the distribution function of a higher δˆ  stochastically dominates that of a lower δˆ , 
marriage is increasingly appealing for a couple with higher δˆ .  This leads to the following 
proposition that provides a rationale for what is found in the empirical literature: 
PROPOSITION 2: Married couples will be happier on average than cohabiting couples.   
The intuition to the result follows from a combination of selection and incentive effects: Every 
couple with *ˆ δδ ≥  opts for marriage over cohabitation.  This combined with the result that 
cooperation is easier within marriage than in cohabitation makes it straightforward to demonstrate 
that every couple choosing marriage has a higher level of expected happiness than every couple 
choosing cohabitation.  The fact that married couples have a higher expected payoff ex ante to 
marriage implies that they are happier on average ex post.   
3.3.  Explaining the Cohabitation Effect 
 Hall and Zhao (1995) find that a primary motive for cohabitation is that individuals use it as a 
screening device for marriage.  Cohan and Kleinbaum (2002) review three hypotheses that have 
sought to explain the cohabitation effect, the association between pre-marital cohabitation and marital 
failure.  Some such as Kurdek (1999) attribute the greater rate of failure of these marriages to union 
duration, explaining that such findings are consistent with a normal decline in marital satisfaction after 
the first few years of marriage and that previously cohabiting couples are, in many respects, farther 
along this path.  A second hypothesis is a self-selection effect: Cohabiting types may be more apt to 
possess negative characteristics that can lead to marital instability and divorce (Thornton, Axinn, and 
Hill, 1992).  Lillard et. al. (1995) provide strong empirical support for this notion.  A third explanation 
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is that poor relational habits that couples acquire in cohabitation have subsequent negative affects 
within marriage (Axinn and Thornton 1992; Schoen and Weinick, 1993).   
 The first hypothesis does not appear to be consistent with empirical work that finds lower 
levels of relational satisfaction among newly cohabiting couples than newly married couples who 
were not cohabiting previously (Brown and Booth, 1996).  Hence the following extension of the 
model draws on the second of these hypotheses; subsequently I will explore the third hypothesis. 
 To provide some structure to the idea of pre-marital cohabitation, assume that after living 
together for m periods, a couple has (weakly) better information about true δ~ , specifically that the 
level of imperfect information shrinks to φc , where φ  ≥ 1.  If φ  > 1, this implies a narrower 
density function over true δ~ , i.e. a density function ( )⋅hˆ  where the mean of ( )⋅hˆ  is contained strictly 
within the domain of ( )⋅g ˆ .  Assume now that in the meta-game, couples either marry directly or 
cohabit for m periods after which they marry or continue in cohabitation.  In this way cohabitation 
adds a certain “option-value” to the relationship.  A couple cohabiting for m periods and deciding to 
marry receives an average payoff of  
      xxx mmc ∞+ ++++++≡ δδαδδαα ...... 1    if Mδδ ≥
~
, and 
υδυδαδδααυ ∞+ ++++++≡ ...... 1mmc    if Mδδ <
~
. 
For simplicity, assume cohabitation is considered only by those with cC 5.0ˆ −≤δδ .  Letting ( )⋅Hˆ  
be the distribution function of ( )⋅hˆ , a couple chooses marriage directly over pre-marital 
cohabitation if  
  ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )αδυδδδυδδ ** ˆˆˆ1ˆ1ˆˆ1 GHxHGGxG cMcMMM ++−−>+−              (7) 
 The explanation of equation (7) is the following:  If a couple decides to cohabit rather than 
marry, the probability that they will choose to marry after m periods is ( )*ˆ1 δG− .  If φ =1 and 
premarital cohabitation has no value in information gathering, then ( )⋅Hˆ  equals ( )⋅Gˆ  and living 
together before marriage only serves to delay the inevitable risk involved in the marriage decision.  As 
premarital cohabitation yields better information, φ  becomes larger and ( )⋅Hˆ  tends toward zero, the 
right-hand-side of (7) converging to ( )( ) ( )αδδ ** ˆˆ1 GxG c +− .  Note that as the updated-information 
parameter φ  approaches infinity, premarital cohabitants never get divorced.   
PROPOSITION 3: With φ < φ*, couples who choose to cohabit prior to marriage are more likely to divorce. 
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The proposition can be easily understood in light of equation (7).  Let **δ  be the cutoff point for 
the decision in (7).   Even with perfect information ( ∞=φ ) available through premarital 
cohabitation, couples with **ˆ δδ >  choose to marry.  With ( )MG δˆ  zero or close to zero, any small 
risk of divorce is more than offset by cxx > .  With ∞=φ , divorce is non-existent among 
premaritally cohabiting couples, but will occur with probability ( )MG δˆ  among directly marrying 
couples.  When 1=φ , divorce is higher for premaritally cohabiting couples since ( )MH δˆ  and 
( )MG δˆ  are monotonically decreasing in δˆ , and δˆ  is higher for directly marrying couples than 
premaritally cohabiting couples.  At some intermediate value ( )∞∈ ,1*φ , divorce rates are the same.  
Thus, one explanation for higher divorce rates among premaritally cohabiting couples is a pure 
selection effect: Unless information acquisition is high in cohabitation, the divorce rate among pre-
marital cohabitants is higher because riskier couples choose it. 
 The third hypothesis of Cohan and Kleinbaum (2002) is that divorce is higher among 
premaritally cohabiting couples because premarital cohabitation fosters poor relational habits. 
A rather informal application of the model suggests how this may happen.  In determining the 
prospects of different potential equilibria, the expectations of players matters.  Expectations 
about behavior have long been recognized as important in equilibrium selection such as in 
models involving “fictitious play” (Robinson, 1951) or “focal points” (Schelling, 1960).  Thus 
in exploring the most likely equilibrium outcomes in marriage, it would be a mistake to ignore 
the role of game play during premarital cohabitation in creating expectations about game play 
during marriage.   
 Marriage typically begins with public vows by the couple against defections, which may help 
to create an optimistic strategy that assumes the best about the other partner’s behavior.   But as the 
proof to PROPOSITION 1 demonstrates, the unique equilibrium in cohabitation for ( )Ci δδ ,0∈  is 
“pseudo-cooperation” in which cooperation occurs in each period with some probability 1* <cp .  
How might this equilibrium behavior in cohabitation affect the creditability of marital vows, and in 
turn influence behavior in marriage?  
 Call the expectation about the probability of cooperation, pc , in each period “trust.”  
Suppose a partner learns to expect a defection every cpn 1= plays of the stage game where n < T.  
A lack of trust increases the incentives to defect from (1) to playing cooperatively if and only if 
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Observe that while the (defecting) right-hand side is the same as in (1) after cancellations, the 
rewards on the (cooperative) left-hand side are smaller given the assumption that nobody prefers to 
be defected on, or 
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.   A deficiency of trust causes a guarded 
behavior, shifting the DD curve upwards to DD′, and raising δM  to δ′M  as in Figure 3.  Here the 
threshold of T increases for any level of δ  to yield the cooperative equilibrium.   
 In summary, the model provides two possible explanations of the cohabitation effect. First, 
it could be attributable to the second of Cohan and Kleinbaum’s hypotheses, a selection effect in the 
context of imperfect screening.  If screening during cohabitation is relatively effective, then it could 
be attributed to the third hypothesis, poor relational habits developed in cohabitation that create a 
self-fulfilling prophesy of reduced cooperation within marriage, with a combination of the two 
effects being possible and even likely. 
IV. EXPLAINING INCREASES IN COHABITATION 
4.1.  Empirical Framework 
 What accounts for the rapid rise of cohabitation in many Western societies?  One answer is 
that the increase in premarital cohabitation is a product of a general movement within western 
society away from traditional ideas about marriage, divorce, birth control, abortion, women’s rights, 
and a host of other related issues.   Another explanation is that increases in cohabitation are the 
product of a (more or less) exogenous historical change, for example, in the manner that Akerlof et. 
al. (1996) attribute the increase in illegitimate births to the advent of the birth control pill.  The two 
most striking empirical facts about the prevalence of cohabitation are (1) the rate at which 
cohabitation has increased in United States, Britain, and most European countries over the last four 
decades; and (2) the considerable differences in cohabitation rates that remain between the 
industrialized nations of Europe, the U.S., and Japan (see Figure 1).  These differences between 
industrialized countries, all with broad exposure to western popular culture for many generations, 
suggest that the cohabitation decision may be influenced by exogenous factors.   
 In the case of the United States, the fact that the dramatic increase in cohabitation occurs in 
during the late 1960s to early 1970s suggests one or more of the following phenomena as potential 
causes: (a) liberalization of divorce laws in many states in the mid-1970s; (b) development and 
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diffusion of oral contraception, i.e. “the pill” in the mid-1960s; (c) the 1973 Supreme Court legalization 
of abortion; and/or (d) increases in women’s labor force participation and wages during this period.  
 What predictions would the model make regarding the influence of each of these 
phenomena on increases in cohabitation and the observed differences between countries?  To find 
predictions on changes in cohabitation rates we return to the basic model where can re-write the 
expression for which a couple prefers marriage to cohabitation in (5) to obtain 
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Noting that changes in cohabitation take place on the margin for those with δˆ  near *δ , the second 
term on the right-hand-side of (9) goes to zero for sufficiently small c .  Solving (9) for *δ we obtain 
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Partial differentiation of (10) with respect to each of the parameters yields 0
*
<
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δ
.  The sign on the divorce payoff is theoretically ambiguous, negative when imperfect 
information and the risk of divorce is high, but positive as the imperfect information parameter c  
gets closer to zero and the “commitment effect” from marriage on relational cooperation dominates. 
 Each of these social changes during the mid-1960s to early 1970s can be interpreted in terms 
of parameter changes in the model.  The legal changes in favor of no-fault divorce laws in the early 
and mid-1970s can be represented as an increase in ν as divorce became easier, less costly, and the 
stigma of divorce lessened.  The development and widespread use of the pill in Europe and the 
United States the mid-1960s allowed for the postponement of childbearing early in the years of both 
cohabitation and marriage.  The ability to plan families may make marriage more attractive, but the 
absence of children in a relationship makes it easier to dissolve; thus, it could theoretically increase 
all of x, ν and α.  Abortion, on the other hand, occurs vastly more frequently outside of marriage 
than within marriage (approximately four times as frequently, according to U.S. Census data).  
Therefore the predominant influence of legalized abortion should be to increase α.  Changes in 
women’s labor force participation increase the reservation utility of women outside both marriage 
and cohabitation, raising both ν and α.  If the value of the cooperative outcome x  relies (or relied) 
in part from gains from exchange originating from women specializing in housework and child 
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raising (time contributed to the household), and men specializing in paid work (money contributed to 
the household), then the movement of women into formal labor markets should also lower x.     
 Based on the effect of these social changes on our parameters, the total effect on the 
cohabitation rate for any social change is υ
υ
δ
α
α
δδδ ∆
∂
∂
+∆
∂
∂
+∆
∂
∂
=∆
***
*
  x
x
.  Given the expected 
effects on x, α, and ν  from the respective societal changes and the sign of their respective derivatives 
on *δ , Table 3 gives the predicted effect on cohabitation from these phenomena.  Liberalization of 
divorce laws make commitment more difficult in marriage, but make the consequences of marital 
failure less harsh.  The effect of the pill is ambiguous as it has similar positive impacts in marriage as in 
cohabitation.  Legalized abortion should yield higher cohabitation rates because of its heavy use in 
preventing out of wedlock births.  Women’s labor force participation should raise cohabitation rates 
from three sources: lowering the gains from household specialization, increasing the payoff from non-
cooperation in marriage, and increasing the reservation payoff in cohabitation.  It’s only influence 
towards marriage may be to make the outcome from a failed marriage better, but this effect vanishes 
as information about partners increases.  Thus, the model points to legalized abortion and increased 
labor force participation by women as the most likely causes of increases in cohabitation. 
4.2.  Data and Methodology 
 There are at least two major challenges in estimating the effects of such factors on 
cohabitation rates.  The first is data availability: One would ideally have panel data containing 
cohabitation rates back to the 1960s or at least early 1970s, when cohabitation rates began their 
sharp upward trend.  Unfortunately, except for some retrospective studies, no such data set exists 
either for the United States or European countries.  Thus we must be content to look for clues 
regarding the relationships between these variables and cohabitation rates from the time they 
became widely available, beginning for the most part in the early 1990s.   
 One set of data is from Batlova and Cohen (2002) who compile figures on 1994 cohabitation 
rates taken from the International Social Survey Programme in which independent institutions in 20 
nations replicate survey questions in their own countries.  The survey asks a large sample of adults in 
each country if they have ever cohabited with a partner outside of marriage.  Included in three of the 
estimations are cohabitation rates from eight additional countries obtained by incorporating data 
from a separate study by Kiernan (2002), in which a slightly different question was asked of 
respondents; the estimated cohabitation rates are predicted values obtained from overlapping 
countries to yield a sample of 28 countries.  The U.S. data on cohabitation were taken from the 
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Bureau of the Census, which began collecting state-level data on cohabiting partners in the 1990 and 
2000 general censuses.  Data descriptions and sources are given in Tables 4, 5, and 6, and scatter 
plots of the cohabitation with divorce and female labor force data (our two continuous variables) are 
given in Plots 1 through 4. 
 The second challenge involves establishing a relationship between cohabitation rates and 
variables that are likely to be endogenous to cohabitation.  Like cohabitation, many variables we might 
suggest as being casual could themselves have been caused by generally liberalizing views, creating an 
omitted variable bias.  However, potential explanatory variables differ in their degree of endogeneity to 
the cohabitation decision: Behavioral variables such as divorce rates, abortion rates, and labor force 
participation seem most likely to vary endogenously with cohabitation rates.  Faith and values variables 
and political conservatism are more likely to exert direct influences on behavior rather than the other 
way around. Policy variables, such as the availability of abortion on demand, legalization of oral 
contraception, waiting periods for divorce would seem to operate in more of a middle ground.  
  Hausman (1978) tests for endogeneity confirmed these general presuppositions.  The null 
hypothesis that women’s labor force participation, abortion rates, and divorce rates are exogenous 
was rejected at the 10 percent level in the U.S. state data.  While the availability of the pill is 
ubiquitous in the United States, mandated health insurance coverage of the pill is not; legislation was 
introduced in 10 states in the late 1990s that mandated health insurance coverage of the pill.1  The 
Hausman test failed to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of contraceptive pill legislation. 
Unlike across the 50 states, the legal availability of first-trimester abortion-on-demand varies from 
country to country, as does the availability of no-fault divorce.  There even exists some variation in 
the availability of the pill, which was illegal in Ireland and Japan in the mid-1990s when the 
cohabitation data was obtained.  While the Hausman test rejected exogeneity of the female presence 
in the labor force at the 10 percent level, it failed to reject abortion availability, legality of the pill, no-
fault divorce, or even divorce rates themselves across countries.   
4.3.  Empirical Results 
 To treat endogeneity problems in the behavioral variables, instrumental variables were used 
in the level estimations on cohabitation rates.  In the cross-country estimations, the ratio of female 
tertiary school enrollment was used as an instrument for women’s labor force participation.  Only 
about two-thirds of the countries in the study have policies allowing first-trimester abortion-on-
                                                 
1
 States mandating health insurance coverage of the pill during the 1990s are Maryland, California, Connecticut, 
Georgia, Hawaii, Maine, New Hampshire, Nevada, North Carolina, and Vermont. (Source: Planned Parenthood, 2002) 
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demand.  Though the 1973 Roe vs. Wade decision had guaranteed this across U.S. states, an 
effective instrument for abortion rates was per capita state expenditure on health services.  Though 
divorce rates would appear to be endogenous, the varying availability of “no-fault” divorce across 
the 28 countries exerts no direct effect on cohabitation, and was used in some of the estimations as 
an instrument for the divorce rate.  Since in the 1990-2000 period, “no-fault” divorce was widely 
available in each of the 50 U.S. states, the varying waiting period for divorce settlement was found to 
be an effective instrument for the U.S. divorce rate.  As shown in Tables 4, 5, and 6, all first-stage 
estimations of endogenous variables on exogenous variables and the set of instruments carried 
F-statistics significant at the 5% level or less, and t-statistics on direct instruments were significant at 
the 5% level in 18 out of 20 first-stage estimations, and close to significant in the other two.   
 Nearly all of the variables have the expected sign in the cross-country second-stage 
estimations in Table 4, though the coefficients on female labor force participation are uniquely 
significant. That the coefficient on abortion availability and measures of Catholicism were 
statistically insignificant was somewhat surprising, even given the small sample size. The abortion 
coefficient, however, approaches significance and is quite consistent across estimations; it would 
imply that the availability of abortion on demand increases the ever-cohabitated rate by about 4 
percentage points around a base mean of 16.6%.  However, the consistency and significance (and 
near significance) of women’s labor force participation is most noteworthy, with an average 
coefficient of 0.554.  Noting that the female labor force variable in the cross-country estimations is 
given as a ratio to labor force participation of men, if we assume a 0.75 participation rate by men, it 
holds that in the cross-country estimations that a 10% increase in labor force participation by 
women is associated with a 14.6% increase in cohabitation.   
 In the estimations in Table 5 on cohabitating partner households as a percent of all 
households from the 2000 U.S. Census, (predicted) abortion rates and contraceptive pill insurance 
coverage were highly insignificant (and even marginally carrying the opposite sign).  By far the biggest 
(negative) predictor of cohabitation rates is the percentage of Christian adherents in a state, a measure 
of the church-going population.  Its negative effect on cohabitation, however, is almost totally through 
mainline Protestants and evangelicals.  Controlling for church attendance, the percentage of Catholic 
adherents was positively related to cohabitation. To capture measures of conservatism, I included the 
percentage of Republican votes received in each state in the 2000 Presidential election in specification 
(2), and dummy variables capturing the now infamous American “red state/blue state” distinction.  
Though there was little change between the 2000 and 2004 elections in this category, I used the results 
from the 2004 vote totals since that election has been regarded as one in which states lined up around 
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issues related to traditional values.  The coefficients all had the expected sign (positive coefficient on 
being a “blue” state increases cohabitation rates), but with small magnitude and non-significance once 
religious values are controlled for.  Female labor force participation emerged again as the uniquely 
significant variable of the four chief candidates, with consistent and strong coefficients across 
specifications.  Most interesting is the similarity in the magnitude of the U.S. states coefficient with 
estimates from the cross-country estimations: An average coefficient of 0.088 in estimations (1)–(4) 
implies a 10% increase in women’s labor force participation in the U.S. is associated with an 11.5% 
increase in cohabitation rates. 
 The final estimation incorporates the earliest U.S. Census data available on cohabiting 
partners, taken in 1990.  Table 6 presents a difference-in-differences regression on increases in 
cohabitation across U.S. states from 1990 to 2000.  Nearly all coefficients carry the expected sign, 
though of the four key variables, only the coefficients on changes in women’s labor force participation 
are statistically significant.  Men’s income, interestingly, is significant in one of the estimations and 
consistently negative.  This is also true in the estimations on levels, hinting that as male incomes rise, 
cohabitation appears to be more rare. The coefficients on the religious variables are insignificant in the 
differences estimation, probably due to only relatively minor changes over 10 years that are not 
captured well by the data.  Though seemingly unlikely, I attempted to control for the possibility of 
greater rates of “liberalization” in some states by utilizing the change in Republican vote percentage in 
the general elections between 1992 and 2000 in each state.   
 A potential problem with difference-in-differences estimations is the issue that historical 
momentum of a third factor (for example a long-term movement toward liberal lifestyles in some 
states as distinct from others) may produce spurious correlations in the data between variables in the 
estimations. To try to control for this problem, I included the lagged difference in the Republican vote 
in each state from 1980 to 1992 in specification (4).  The coefficient is positive (yet only significant at 
the 21% level), but does somewhat dampen the magnitude of the women’s labor force coefficient. Yet 
once more women’s labor force participation is uniquely significant at the 10 percent level in most 
estimations, though the magnitude is somewhat smaller than in the two other data sets, with an 
average coefficient among the four estimations in Table 6 equal to 0.0488.  The prediction from the 
1990-2000 difference estimations then is that a 10% increase in women’s labor force participation is 
associated with a 6.4% increase in cohabitation.   
 Although the historical panel data set doesn’t exist that could provide stronger tests on the 
causes of the increase in cohabitation rates, the more recent existing data does seem to yield some 
insight into the rise of cohabitation as an alternative family arrangement in western culture.  That 
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women’s labor force participation is uniquely significant in all three sets of data estimations, using 
different data sets and estimation techniques, and that the magnitudes of the coefficients are 
relatively similar, is the most striking result from the empirical study. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
Why has marriage in some form existed as a fundamental institution in virtually every society 
and culture?  The answer is that marriage serves a crucial role in creating stable forms of cooperation 
within the nuclear family.  It creates this stability by endogenizing altruistic behavior within the family 
better than relationships that embody lower forms of commitment such as informal cohabitation.  
Since within marriage a partner is more apt to accept consequences for selfish behavior rather than 
exit the relationship, selfish behavior is more likely to lie off the equilibrium path.   
Cohabitation as a pre-marital screening device has become increasingly popular, to the point of 
being a social norm in some western sub-cultures; it also has strong intuitive appeal.  Yet the data 
consistently indicate a negative association between pre-marital cohabitation and marital satisfaction.  
This paper has attempted to clarify why this may be so, arguing that it appears to be commitment rather 
than mere togetherness that lays the foundation for long-term cooperation and happiness in family 
relationships.  This, of course, is the traditional wisdom.  It is hoped, nevertheless, that examining 
relationships in a formal framework yields insight into the subtle rationale that lies in the background 
of this wisdom. 
What explanation does this paper give about the rise of cohabitation in western society?  The 
following story would be consistent with the theoretical and empirical results of this research: Until 
the 1960s, arguably the primary function of marriage was not emotional and personal fulfillment, but 
an exchange based on traditional contributions of money (by the husband) and time (by the wife) to 
household formation and the raising of children.  The value of this exchange enhanced the reward 
accruing from household cooperation (the value x the model).  As gender roles began to blur in the 
1960s and 1970s, young adults began to be able to function more independently as autonomous 
multi-taskers, with women entering and gaining upward mobility in the labor force in greater 
numbers, and men becoming more willing (and even eager) to engage in activities such as cooking 
meals and raising children. While these trends were clearly positive for the household in many 
respects, they began to change the payoffs to relational conflict and cooperation.  As women entered 
the work force, this both eroded some of the value of the family division of labor while 
simultaneously increasing the reservation payoffs received after a divorce or break-up (ν and α in 
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the model).  Changes in these payoffs may have been further augmented by the legalization of 
abortion, and by declining numbers of Christian adherents in some areas in the western 
industrialized world, such that the consensus view supporting marriage over cohabitation as a social 
norm became less clear.  While the traditional gains from exchange in marriage slowly dissipated, 
what remained was the need for personal companionship and the emotional fulfillment of 
relationship.  However, the relative ease at which members of the partnership could function 
independently diminished the checks to self-interested behavior within relationships and 
consequences of relational failure.  As men and women needed each other less within the 
household, long-term marital cooperation became more difficult, making marriage, from an ex ante 
standpoint, a somewhat riskier and less attractive proposition, given any doubt about the potential 
for relational harmony.  Given the increased risks in marriage and the continuing need for emotional 
fulfillment, cohabitation may have thus arisen as a seemingly safer alternative. 
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    Defection Deterrence (DD) and Consequence Acceptance (CA) Curves   
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 Figure 3 
              Effect of Pre-Marital Cohabitation on Trust and Cooperation   
  
  T 
 
 DD′    
  CA 
T-period    DD    
consequences   
needed for coop      CA' 
 
 
 0           δM         δM′  δ*            δC     1 
 
 
AUS
AUT
BEL
BUL
CAN
CZR
DENFIN
FRC
GER
GRC
HUN
IRE
ISR
IT L
JAP
LUX
NET
NZL
NOR
POL
PRT
RUS
SLO
SPA
SWE
UNK
USA
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
pc
oh
a
b
.5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
f mlabrat
      
AUS
AUT
BEL
BUL
CAN
CZR
DENFIN
FRC
GER
GRC
HUN
IRE
ISR
TL
JAP
LUX
NET
NZL
NOR
POL
PRT
RUS
SLO
SPA
SWE
UNK
USA
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
pc
oh
a
b
1 2 3 4
div rate
        Plot 
Plot 1: Cross-country 1994 ever-cohabitated rates Plot 2: Cross country 1994 ever-cohabitated  
                 and female labor participation ratios.                rates and divorce rates.  
 
AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
L A
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MOMT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
S C
SD
TN
TX
UT
V T
V A
WA
WV
WI
WY
.
03
.
04
.
05
.
06
.
07
co
ha
b%
00
.5 .55 .6 .65 .7
wompclf 00
      
AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
K Y
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MOMT
NE
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NCND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TNTX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY
.
03
.
04
.
05
.
06
.
07
co
ha
b%
00
.005 .01 .015
pcdiv 00
  
       Plot 3: U.S. states, 2000 cohabitation rates and Plot 4: U.S. states, 2000 cohabitation rates  
                    female labor participation rates.      and divorce rates. (Note: NV = 0.07, 0.065,  
    HW = 0.02, 0.053.) 
 25 
 
Table 1 
Percentage of Adults Who Report Ever Having Cohabited with a 
Partner Outside of Marriage, Selected Countries
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Source: Batlova and Cohen (2002)
 
 
 
Table 2 
 
Percentage of U.S. Respondents Who Agree with Statement, “Is it all right (sic) for an unmarried couple to live 
together as long as they have plans to marry?” 
 
 
1976-77 1980-81 1985-86 1989-90 1993-94 1997-98 
Men 46.9% 42.3% 53.1% 54.8% 61.6% 66.9% 
             N  3,290 3,342 2,970 2,698 2,416 2,386 
Women 33.0% 33.3% 39.3% 47.9% 51.2% 59.1% 
             N 3,423 3,325 3,226 2,584 2,760 2,597 
Source: Thornton and Young-de Marco (2001). Data source: U.S. National Survey of Families and Households.  
 
 
Table 3 
 
Predicted Effects of Social Changes on Cohabitation 
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Historical Change: 
 
∆x 
 
∆α 
 
∆ν 
Probable Effect on 
*δ  
(cohabitation rate) 
Liberalization of divorce laws/ 
introduction of no-fault divorce 0
 0 + ? 
Development and dissemination 
of oral contraception +
 + + ?  
Legalization of abortion,  
e.g. Roe vs. Wade, 1973.  0
 + 0 + 
Increase in women's labor force 
participation and wages 
_ 
+ + + 
 
 26 
Table 4 
Two-Stage Least Squares Estimations 
Dependent Variable: Fraction of Adults Indicating Cohabitation During Lifetime,X = 0.166 
Variable: 
(1994 Data) 
 
X  
Sample Size:  
28 countriesd 
Sample Size: 20 
countries 
Variable 
Explanation/Source: 
  OLS --2SLS Estimations--  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
ABORTONDEM?a 0.643 0.0429 
(1.51) 
0.0396 
(1.38) 
0.0382 
(1.30) 
0.0431 
(1.41) 
0.0457 
(1.41) 
0.0369 
(0.88) 
Dummy = 1 if Abortion on 
Demand: Center for 
Reproductive Rights 
FAMLABRATIO 0.781 0.3139 
  (2.38)** 
0.5126 
  (1.92)* 
0.5052 
(1.88)* 
0.5497 
(1.57) 
0.5944 
(1.43) 
0.6080 
(1.64) 
F/Male Lab. Force 
Participation Ratio: World 
Devopment Indicators 
DIVORCERATEb 5.439 0.0280 
(1.84)* 
0.03296 
(1.22) 
0.0322 
(1.15) 
0.0221 
(1.22) 
0.0381 
(1.15) 
0.0239 
(1.18) 
Divorce Rate: 
UN Marriage & Divorce 
Statistics 
PILLLEGAL?c 0.928 0.0140 
(0.25) 
  -0.0220 
(-0.28) 
-0.0436 
(-0.42) 
 Legality of the 
Contraceptive Pill  
in 1994. 
CATHOLIC? 0.321 -0.0220 
(-0.70) 
-0.0028 
(0.06) 
 -0.0013 
(-0.03) 
 
0.0154 
(0.24) 
0.0282 
(0.44) 
Dummy = 1  
if Predominately  
Catholic Country 
NOMCATHOLIC? 
 
 
0.428   -0.0095 
(-0.18) 
   Fraction of Population  
Nominally Catholic:  
World Factbook 
Constant  -0.172 
(-1.78)* 
-0.3306 
(-1.51) 
-0.3174 
(-1.39) 
-0.3159 
(-1.43) 
-0.3729 
(0.299) 
-0.3878 
(-1.38) 
 
R2  0.5914 0.536 0.543 0.532 0.588 0.4151  
F-stat, p-value  6.4, 
0.001 
5.2, 
0.003 
5.5, 0.003 5.1, 
0.003 
3.7, 0.01 3.8, 0.026  
         
First Stage 
Estimations: 
  Coeff:  
t-stat: 
F-stat, p: 
Coeff:  
t-stat: 
F-stat, p: 
Coeff:  
t-stat: 
F-stat: 
Coeff:  
t-stat: 
F-stat, p: 
Coeff:  
t-stat: 
F-stat, p: 
 
FAMLABRATIO 
(Instrument: 
FEMTERCENRL) 
1.216  0.3167 
(2.45)** 
3.67, 
0.02 
3.088 
(2.33)** 
3.26, 0.03 
0.2619 
(2.07)* 
4.1, 
0.001 
0.2404 
(1.72)* 
2.8, 0.06 
0.2597 
(1.93)* 
3.3, 0.026 
Tertiary Fem. Enroll. Ratio: 
World Development 
Indicators 
DIVORCERATEb 
(Instrument: 
NOFAULTAVAIL?) 
0.857  1.311 
(3.20)*** 
3.96, 
0.01 
1.259 
(3.00)*** 
3.65, 0.02 
 1.406 
(3.19)*** 
4.9,0.001 
 No Fault Divorce 
Available? 
Source: Author Research 
         
a
Defined as unqualified access to abortion during the initial gestational phase. bDivorce rates are the number of final 
divorce decrees granted under civil law per 1,000 population.  Instrumental variable estimations on divorce rate are 
provided in estimations 2, 3 and 5; uninstrumented in 1, 4 and 6.  cThe contraceptive pill was illegal in both Ireland and 
Japan at the time of the cohabitation data, 1994. (t-statistics are given in parentheses.)  dCountries in Batlova and 
Cohen’s original sample of 20 include Australia, Ireland, Italy, Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Israel, the 
Netherlands, Japan, Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Hungary, Sweden, Norway, Bulgaria, Slovenia, 
Poland and Russia.  Those from Kiernan’s study include Belguim, Denmark, Finaland, France, Greece, Luxemburg, 
Portugal, and Spain. 
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Table 5 
Two-Stage Least Squares Estimations 
Dependent Variable: Fraction of Opposite-Sex Cohabiting Households (Levels), X =0.0474 
Variable: 
(Year: 2000) 
 
X  
Sample Size:  
50 U.S. States 
Variable 
Explanation/Source: 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  
WOMINCOM 0.728 0.0316 
(0.89) 
0.0346 
(0.82) 
0.0316 
(0.88) 
 Women’s avg. income as 
fraction of men’s avg. income 
by statea 
WOMPLFPART 0.617 0.09139 
(1.70)* 
0.0891 
(1.46) 
0.0917 
 (1.70)* 
0.0829 
 (1.63) 
Female labor force partic. 
rate (US Bureau of Labor 
Stat.)  
PCDIVORCE 0.010 0.2696 
(0.67) 
0.2491 
(0.57) 
0.2769 
(0.60) 
0.2331 
(0.47) 
Per-capita divorce rate 
(Center for Disease Control) 
PCABORTION 0.00287 -0.3125 
(-0.16) 
-0.3870 
(-0.19) 
-0.3036 
(-0.15) 
-0.3200 
(-0.17) 
Per capita abortions by state 
(Dep. of Heath & Hum. 
Serv) 
PILLINSURE 0.200 -0.0025 
(-0.52) 
-0.0023 
(-0.42) 
-0.0026 
(-0.48) 
-0.0013 
(-0.22) 
State mandated insurance 
coverage of the pill by 1999 
CHRISTADHER 0.483 -0.0627 
 (-6.51)*** 
-0.0636 
(-5.72)*** 
-0.0624 
(-5.38)*** 
-0.0663 
(-5.05)*** 
Christian Adherents (Regular 
Church Attenders Only)  
PERCCATHOL 
 
0.196 0.0469 
(5.15)*** 
0.0484 
(3.46)*** 
0.0474 
(4.59)*** 
0.0467 
(4.73)*** 
Percent Catholic  
(American Religion Archive) 
PERCURBAN 
 
0.682 -0.0162 
(-1.30) 
-0.0157 
(-1.19) 
-0.0164 
(-1.22) 
-0.0091 
(-0.46) 
Percentage of households by 
state located in urban areas 
MENSINC 
 
27.790 
($000) 
   -0.00372 
(-0.76) 
Average Men’s Income  
by state 
REPUB2000 
 
0.145  0.00003 
(0.16) 
  Percent Voted Conservative 
(Republican) in 2000 
Election 
BLUESTATE 
 
0.380   0.00022 
(0.07) 
0.00164 
(0.59) 
Dummy = 1 if  “Blue State” 
(Voted Republican in 2004) 
Constant  -0.0009 
(-0.03) 
-0.0031 
(-0.11) 
0.0300 
(-0.04) 
0.0370 
(0.94) 
 
R2  0.7066 0.7139 0.7046 0.7253  
F-stat, p-value  12.89, 0.00 11.73, 0.00 11.11, 0.00 11.71, 0.00  
       
First Stage 
Estimations: 
 Coeff:  
t-stat: 
F-stat, p: 
Coeff:  
t-stat: 
F-stat, p: 
Coeff:  
t-stat: 
F-stat: 
Coeff:  
t-stat: 
F-stat, p: 
Instrumental Variable 
Explanation/Source: 
WOMPLFPART 
(Instrument: 
PCTOTENR) 
1.216 1.700 
(2.15)* 
2.27, 0.04 
1.631 
(2.11)* 
2.51, 0.02 
1.594 
(2.02)* 
2.24, 0.39 
1.865 
(2.52)** 
3.2, 0.004 
Per Capita Enrollment in 
Degree-Granting Institutions 
US Nat’l. Center for  Educ. 
PCDIVORCE 
(Instrument: 
DURAREQ) 
0.857 -0.0007 
(-1.90)* 
2.28, 0.04 
-0.0006 
(-1.74)* 
1.99, 0.06 
-0.0006 
(-1.56) 
2.37, 0.03 
-0.0006 
(-1.37) 
2.71, 0.01 
Duration Requirement for 
Settlement of Divorce: 
Elrond and Spector (2000) 
PCABORTION 
(Instrument: 
PCHEALTHEX) 
0.857 1.421 
(4.28)*** 
7.50, 0.00 
1.401 
(4.22)*** 
6.75, 0.00 
1.391 
(4.12)*** 
6.75, 0.00 
1.480 
(4.42)*** 
6.39, 0.00 
State-level Per Capita Health 
Expenditures:  
Milbank Memorial Fund 
 aData is from 2000 US Census unless otherwise noted. (t-statistics are given in parentheses.) 
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Table 6 
Difference-in-Differences Estimations, 1990-2000 
Dependent Variable: Change in Fraction of Cohabiting Households (Differences), X = 0.0143 
Variable: 
(Year: 2000) 
 
X  
Sample Size:  
50 U.S. States 
Variable 
Explanation/Source: 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  
DWOMINCOM 0.0664 -0.1505 
(-0.54) 
-0.0144 
(-0.49) 
-0.01351 
(-0.45) 
0.00060 
(0.02) 
Change in women’s inc. as 
fraction of men’s avg. income 
by state, 1990-2000a 
DWOMPLFPART 0.0298 0.0513 
(2.22)** 
0.0506 
(2.04)** 
0.0540 
(2.11)** 
0.03938 
(1.41) 
Change in female labor 
force partic. rate, 1991-2000 
(US Bureau of Labor Stat.)  
DPCDIVORCE 0.0047 0.0035 
(0.07) 
0.00314 
(0.06) 
-0.0105 
(-0.18) 
0.0113 
(0.18) 
Change in per-capita 
divorce rate, 1990-2000 
(Center for Disease 
Control) 
DPCABORTION -0.0012 0.1333 
(0.25) 
0.1376 
(0.26) 
0.0760 
(0.14) 
0.0760 
(0.14) 
Change in per cap 
abortions by state, 1990-
2000 (Dept. of H. & Hum. 
Serv.) 
DPILLINSURE 0.200 -0.0010 
(-0.91) 
-0.0010 
(-0.83) 
-0.00073 
(-0.54) 
-0.0011 
(-0.80) 
Change in state mandated 
insurance coverage of 
contraceptive pill 1990-99 
DCHRISTADHER -0.0449 -0.1002 
(-1.02) 
-0.0010 
(-1.01) 
-0.0044 
(-0.32) 
0.0080 
(0.47) 
Change in per capita 
Christian Adherents,  
1990-2000 
DPERCCATHOL 
 
0.00721 0.00021 
(0.01) 
-0.00043 
(-0.02) 
-0.00738 
(-0.31) 
-0.01299 
(-0.54) 
Change in Cath. Adherents  
1990-2000 (American 
Religion Archive) 
DMENSINC 
 
8.038 
($000) 
-0.00058 
(-1.69)* 
-0.00043 
(-1.43) 
-0.00046 
(-1.07) 
-0.00037 
(-0.85) 
Change in Average Men’s 
Income  by state,  
1990-2000 
DREPUB9200 
 
12.199  0.000091 
(0.10) 
-0.000022 
(-0.21) 
0.000084 
(0.62) 
Change in percent voted 
Republican between 1992 
and 2000 General Election 
DREPU8092 
 
    0.001553 
(1.26) 
Change in percent voted 
Republican between 1980 
and 1992 General Election 
BLUESTATE 
 
0.380 
 
  -0.00101 
(-0.59) 
-0.00078 
(-0.46) 
Dummy = 1 if  “Blue 
State” (Voted Republican in 
2004) 
Constant  0.0184 
(4.94) 
0.0181 
(3.83) 
0.0181 
(3.80) 
0.0181 
(3.83) 
 
R2  0.283 0.283 0.289 0.289  
F-stat, p-value  2.02, 
0.064 
1.76, 0.11 1.59, 0.145 1.61, 0.135  
 aData is from 2000 US Census unless otherwise noted. (t-statistics are given in parentheses.) 
 
 
 
 
 
